Development as a process open to learning: ten challenges for aid
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Abstract
A certain consensus exists about the low level of efficiency in aid. The explanation can be attributed to, in some cases, misbehaviour by recipients and, in others, insubstantial commitments on the part of donors. In this article, the author presents the argument that the cause of such a result lies in the very logic of the system and the kind of relationships it encourages. There is no one agent responsible for failure in aid, but a system that generates unsuitable incentives. To illustrate this statement, central to the argument, a decalogue is given of aspects that explain the problems mentioned, which represent an equal number of challenges for aid systems. The author defends, as a factor for change, the promotion of substantial improvement of “quality” as regards the recipients.
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